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ABSTRACT 
While the number of substantive investments in IS projects continues to grow, the number of 
failing projects also continues to increase at an alarming rate. Both the academic and industry 
literature suggests that inadequate attention to risk and its management continues to be a key 
factor in project failure. The typical approach taken is to identify and map potential risks, to 
act as a planning and diagnostic tool, and to prepare a contingency plan has been a factor-
based approach. While it remains a valuable tool for mapping anticipated risks the factor-
based approach is less effective when viewing project risks as emergent phenomena that un-
fold during the course of the project, and require ongoing attention and risk management. In-
formed by a case study of a failing university IS development project, this paper focuses on the 
phenomenon of risk escalation. The case findings suggest that rather than being defined ahead 
of the project, some project risks may emerge during the project as a consequence of escalation 
factors that were both antecedent to and a consequence of actual risk management decisions. 
The article concludes with suggestions as to how project managers can better man-age the 
emergent rather than static nature of risk phenomena. 
Keywords: information systems project management, risk, risk management, risk escalation, 
project escalation 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Substantive investments in information systems (IS) continue to be made as managers seek a 
source of leverage for improving the efficiency and productivity of the organizations within 
which they work. At the same time a high volume of IS projects continue to end up as failing 
projects, either cancelled or abandoned through poor management or over spend, or otherwise 
incomplete in some way through not working or not meeting the expectations of their users 
(Creswell et al., 2011, McLeod and MacDonell, 2011, McManus and Wood-Harper, 2007, 
Morrison et al., 2011, Pankratz and Basten, 2013). While factors that contribute to IS project 
failures are diverse (Fortune and White, 2006), a lack of identification of the risks involved in 
developing IS along with a lack of adequate management of these risks have been common 
findings in many studies (de Bakker et al., 2010, Kerr and Houghton, 2010, Kitsch et al., 2013, 
PM Solutions, 2011, Rozenes, 2011, Wilton, 2005). 
IS project risks can be characterized as the uncertainties that prevent a project team from 
delivering a planned system on time and within budget. IS project risk management can 
therefore be defined as the effort required to develop and implement strategies that counter 
the uncertainties that threaten the possible success of a project (Sherer, 1992). Traditional IS 
risk management typically involves a factor-based approach, the first and foremost stage of 
which involves the risk manager in identifying and defining the potential risks (Dey et al., 
2007, Project Management Institute, 2013). At this stage, foreseeable project risks are 
identified and contingency plans drawn up to mitigate the risks and limit their impact should 
they arise on a project (Kim and Park, 2006, Project Management Institute, 2013, Teller, 
2013). The premise of the factor-based approach to IS risk management is that risks are entities 
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that can be identified and defined prior to the commencement of a project; that they are time 
and context independent, and that the nature and attributes of such risks remain static 
throughout the lifetime of a project. Such a ‘factor-based’ approach to risk management, has 
been widely adopted (Barki et al., 1993, Dagher and Kuzic, 2011, Kappleman et al., 2006, 
Tiwana and Keil, 2004), nevertheless the approach overlooks the emergent nature of risks 
(Leonard, 2012, Wright and Capps, 2010).  
First, a factor-based approach takes little account of how risks and their management depend 
on a decision maker's or group of decision-makers’ own understandings and attitudes towards 
those risks and the situation to which they relate; as a consequence poor risk management can 
itself become a risk for a project. Second, the approach does not take into account the fact that 
risks can emerge as a result of complex social interaction; that risks can emerge in situ and not 
necessarily be predicted (Lyytinen and Robey, 1999). Third, a factor-based approach has 
normally not taken into account the interdependence of different risks and how the occurrence 
of one risk can be the cause of or the consequence of another risk (Belassi and Tukel, 1996, 
Nandhakumar, 1996). Fourth, since risks can be emergent and interdependent, the nature of 
these risks and their properties can vary from one project stage to another, and from project to 
project (Larsen and Myers, 1998). Finally, IS project risks may emerge during a project as a 
result of unexpected factors; either within the project (e.g. changes in users’ expectations of a 
system or a change of project champion), or within the environment of the project (e.g. changes 
in organizational or market environments, or in government policy). In summary, while a 
factor-based approach remains a valuable tool for mapping anticipated risks the factor-based 
approach is less effective when viewing project risks as emergent phenomena that unfold 
during the course of the project, and require ongoing attention and risk management. 
While a factor-based approach is capable of anticipating what and why risks occur, for the 
purposes of predicting and controlling these risks through effective risk management; a more 
dynamic approach begins to ask how risks emerge as a function of ongoing risk management 
decisions. The purpose of this article is to bridge this gap by focusing on the phenomenon of 
risk escalation which refers to the tendency for decision makers “ to become locked into a 
course of action, throwing good money after bad or committing new resources to a losing 
course of action” (Staw, 1981, p. 578). Informed by a case study of a university IS development 
project, the findings suggest that rather than being defined ahead of the project, different types 
of project risk emerged during the project as a consequence of escalation factors that were both 
antecedent to and a consequence of risk management decisions. The article concludes with 
suggestions for how project managers can better manage the emergent rather than static 
nature of risk phenomena. The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a review 
of three main categories of risk that can arise on an IS development project: requirements risk, 
personnel risks, and resource management risks. This is followed by a description of research 
strategy including the case study approach used, data collection, data analysis methods and 
escalation model as analytical framework. A findings section initially describes the risks that 
arose on the project, and why before introducing a model of risk escalation. The article 
concludes with suggestions as to how project managers can better manage the emergent rather 
than static nature of risk phenomena.  
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
In this review, we first focus on project risks occurring in the areas of requirements, personnel, 
and resource management. While uncertainties and risks can occur in a number of other areas 
of an IS project including organizational environment, user commitment, project 
management, resource management, personnel, requirements, development process and 
technology; it is these areas that are particularly relevant to our case, and which subsequently 
inform the development of our risk escalation model. In the second part of the review we 
discuss escalating factors that contribute to project as well as risk escalation. The discussion is 
based on Keil’s (1995) model and organised under the headings of project, psychological, social 
and structural factors.  
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2.1 Risk Factors on information systems projects 
2.1.1 Requirements risks 
Requirements risks refer to project uncertainties that arise from changing requirements, 
requirements misunderstanding, and incomplete requirements (Schmidt et al., 2001; 
Robinson et al., 2003; Keil et al., 2006). Changing requirements is a common requirement risk 
that almost all projects would encounter and the reasons for changing requirements include 
changes in business environment which inevitably invokes changes in requirements so that the 
envisaged system can reflect the change (Land, 1982); conflicts or politics concerning system 
specifications between user departments (Sherer and Alter, 2004; Wallace et al., 2004), and 
the lack of understanding of the envisioned system on user’s part means that users are likely 
to change their mind about what they want from the system (Jiang et al., 1999; Kumar, 2002). 
Continuous changes in requirements means that it is difficult for the project team to control 
the progress of the project, resource allocation, and budget (Tiwana and Keil, 2004).  
Risk of requirement misunderstanding occurs for a number of possible reasons. These include 
differing perceptions of the system or outcome of IS project development between stake-
holders (Sumner, 2000, Schmidt et al., 2001); neither of the project team nor users having a 
good understanding of the envisioned system (Dey et al., 2007); lack of communication 
between project team and user groups to clarify the requirements (Coughlan et al., 2003); and 
stakeholders are unable to articulate their requirements to the project team. Furthermore, user 
requirements may not always be carefully defined and effectively translated into the design by 
the project team (Kim et al., 2005; Dey et al., 2007; Han and Huang, 2007). An implication 
from misunderstanding requirements for the system development is the failure to develop 
necessary or the development of unnecessary functionalities (Ropponen and Lyytinen, 2000; 
Kim et al., 2005) which leads to subsequent system modifications and hence project delays 
(McAllister, 2006). 
Incomplete requirement risks arise when not all of user requirements are collected and 
considered or some user requirements are overlooked or ignored either by project team or by 
users (Lauesen and Vinter, 2001; Yeo, 2002). There are reasons for why requirements are not 
collected or overlooked including changes in the system requirements or in expectation of the 
system because the situation has changed during the course of the project; the project team 
does not have appropriate or use inappropriate methods to collect user requirements; and the 
project team fails to verify their understanding with users but develops the system based on 
their own assumptions (Howcroft and Wilson, 2003). Incomplete user requirements can result 
the project team in spending more time on collecting user requirements from users and 
correcting or modifying the design accordingly in the later stage of the project (Lauesen and 
Vinter, 2001). 
2.1.2 Personnel risks 
Personnel risks are often cited as reasons for project failure (Sherer and Alter, 2004; Kim and 
Park, 2006; Han and Huang, 2007). The risks arise due to insufficient number of skilled 
personnel to deliver the project (Keil et al., 2006); unrealistic estimation of staffing time which 
causes more work per capita (Ropponen and Lyytinen, 2000; Peterson et al., 2002; Kim and 
Park, 2006; Han and Huang, 2007); high staff turnover rate that causes legacy in terms of 
knowledge and time and hence project delays(Wallace et al., 2004; Kim and Park, 2006); and 
over relaying on one or few people which puts the project at risk if the personnel resigns or 
leaves the project (Schmidt et al., 2001).Project mangers’ ability to manage personnel can 
contribute to personnel risks for example overestimating project staff’s ability can result in 
inappropriate resource allocation such as human and time (Ropponen and Lyytinen, 2000); 
failing to organize sufficient training sessions for the staff(Peterson et al., 2002; Kim and Park, 
2006; Han and Huang, 2007) can create situations where staff does not have sufficient up to 
date skills and knowledge; and failing to motivate staff to commit to the project (Sherer and 
Alter, 2004; Wallace et al., 2004). 
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2.1.3 Resource management risks 
Resource management risks refer to uncertainties in relation to project planning and control 
of project resources. A project can face resource management risk from the outset for example 
when a project has insufficient budget to deliver the project (Jiang et al., 1999; Sumner, 2000; 
Sherer and Later, 2004; Dey et al., 2007). Resource management risks can arise from 
mismanagement of resources because of not using or lack of appropriate tools to calculate 
required resources and failing to estimate required resources correctly (Ropponen and 
Lyytinen, 2000; Barki et al., 2001; Schmidt et al., 2001; Han and Huang, 2007); and failure to 
involve key project stakeholders in the budget planning process (Barki et al., 2001). 
Mismanaging budget refers to the situations where project budget is unevenly allocated and 
used for example a project may use up much of its resources early in the project (Keil, 1995; 
Schmidt et al., 2001) or the resources are misused by being allocated to support the activities 
that are not relevant to the project (Keil and Mann, 1997; Wallace et al., 2004). 
2.2 Escalation factors 
Escalation of commitment has received much attention in the IS domain in particular the 
studies in IS project failures (Drummond, 1996, 1998, Jamieson and Hyland, 2006, Keil and 
Mann, 1997, Mähring and Keil, 2008, Pan et al, 2009). An extensive study of the failing Taurus 
project at the London Stock Exchange has for example shown and explained how decision 
makers were constrained by the unique relationship between the London Stock Exchange and 
the market; and the complex interactions, e.g. negotiation and compromise, between different 
departments and those who had the power to influence decisions (Drummond, 1996). 
Consequently they were trapped in a situation of escalation, and committed to allocating more 
resources to a failing project until such time as the project was cancelled. A study of an IS 
project in a utilities service company shows that an escalation of commitment was an outcome 
of recursive interactions between the project, organizational work activities, and their contexts 
(Pan et al., 2009). A customer centric organizational culture for example created a situation 
where decision makers found it difficult not to accept requests for changes from users. The 
commitment to accept constant changes in user requirements soon led to project delays, which 
in turn led to a problem in resource planning. The project further deviated from the initial plan 
as some of the systems features were no longer required because of changes in the business 
environment e.g. the decrease in customer numbers. The Mandata project, which was 
sponsored by the Australian Public Service Board and aimed to assist office automation, 
information management, and records processing for the entire Australian Public Service, is 
another example of project escalation that led to project abandonment (Sauer, 1993). The 
project ran through 1970s and was finally terminated in 1981 and the total cost of the project 
was about 30 million Australian dollars. According to Sauer (1993) the project suffered from a 
chronic haemorrhage of support, lack of sufficient resources, insufficient project planning (e.g. 
no definite implementation date), lack of strategic applications in the system that were useful 
to the stakeholders, and so on. Sauer (1993:69) states that a possible explanation for why 
authority let an obvious failing project continue because the Board wanted to avoid 
embarrassment or political damage from loss of face; and the project might have been subject 
to a form of escalating commitment. These studies have observed that escalations are usually 
determined by a combination of different factors; that they don’t ‘just happen’ but the 
outcomes of a subtle interplay between people, context, and technology which develop over 
time; and that they are not one-phase phenomena but cut through all phases (Alvarez et al., 
2011, Winch, 2008).  
Escalating factors can be categorized into four main types: project, psychological, social, and 
structural (Staw and Ross, 1987). Project factors are the attributes of a project that play a role 
in determining the continuation or termination of an existing course of action e.g. the size and 
scope of a project, the economic structure of a project, the foreseeable expenditure or costs 
required to complete the project, and the availability of alternative courses of action. Decision 
makers tend to keep allocating resources to a project when they believe that the payoff will 
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benefit the organization in the long-term or when they believe that the project is close to 
reaching completion (Keil et al., 2000).  
 
Figure 1. Summary model of factors influencing escalation 
Source: Keil (1995, p.436) 
Psychological factors are a further salient influence on people’s behaviour in escalation 
situations. These include self-justification, self-inference, and bias when processing 
information. Self-justification is an important element in studying the reasons for escalation 
in commitment. With respect to self-justification it has proposed for example that individuals 
will be biased in their attitudes and therefore in their decision making if they feel personally 
responsible for the initial funding of the project or for its negative consequences, a perception 
grounded in an individuals’ desire to affirm their reasoning and competence (Staw, 1976, 
1981). Therefore individuals will tend to commit additional resources either in order to justify 
their previously chosen course of action or in an attempt to turn a situation around.  
Self-inference on the other hand refers to a situation where decision makers tend to examine 
their own actions in a particular social context, and to infer personal values and preferences 
from previous actions (Staw and Ross, 1987). Staw and Ross (1987) identify a number of 
situations where individuals find themselves bound or committed to a behaviour for example 
when their acts are explicit or unambiguous, their acts are irrevocable or difficult to undo, their 
acts are important to the individuals concerned, or their acts are public or are visible to others. 
A further significant psychological factor is the biased processing of information that can occur 
when interested decision-makers attempt to prove or disprove the beliefs of others (Nisbett 
and Ross, 1980). When the perceived outcome of another’s suggestion does not meet the 
decision-maker’s expectations, a decision-maker may be selective for example in the choice of 
information processed, as a way of bolstering the efficacy of his/her own judgment and in an 
effort to disprove the source of the counter argument (Staw and Ross, 1987). A framing effect 
can also influence information processing. A frame of reference may be created that is overly 
optimistic in the confidence it attaches to the prospect of victory or of winning the ‘game’. Such 
an overly confident frame of reference commonly leads to a situation of loss rather than of gain, 
due to the restrictive effects that an optimistic frame of reference places on the subsequent 
processing of what would have further relevant information (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984, 
Whyte, 1993).  
Social factors consist of the social forces that bind decision makers to their positions. The 
desire of a decision-maker not to lose face or credibility in front of others is a powerful social 
factor that can lead to escalating behaviour. Face saving also explains a situation where 
decision makers neither accept their previous mistakes nor reveal any of their errors to others 
(Staw and Ross, 1987). As a result decision-makers will be inclined to commit even more 
resources to an existing current course of action so as to avoid losing social credibility 
(Brockner et al., 1981, Drummond, 1998, Montealegre and Keil, 2000). When faced with an 
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ambiguous situation individuals will also be inclined to model their behaviour and responses 
on their previous experiences in the same situation (Bandura, 1977). Brockner et al. (1984) 
found that individuals will also allocate further resources to an existing course of action, if the 
same decision taken by others in a similar situation had led to a successful or satisfactory 
outcome. Individuals in an organization who can turn a failing project into a successful one 
usually receive significant reward. The hero effect describes a situation where individuals are 
encouraged to commit to an act that they believe they can turn around (Ross and Staw, 1986).  
Finally, the influence of structural factors, e.g. organizational, cultural, political and 
managerial, may increase as a project unfolds and create conditions for escalation. Issues such 
as change of project champion, management support for continuing a project, changes in 
policies for example can occur at any time during a project and can subsequently influence 
escalation. Sometimes withdrawing from a project is not easy because the project can become 
institutionalized and embedded in an organization over time. The withdrawal of a project can 
potentially entail changes in many parts of the organization and as such may not be agreeable 
to those who are involved.  
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
The case study research method was used to explore the emergent character of IS project 
development risks and risk escalation, and was chosen for a number of reasons. First, use of 
the case study method enables us to gain an understanding of the phenomenon at hand, in this 
case risk escalation, in a naturalistic setting (Benbasat et al., 1987, Yin, 2009). Second, it is a 
method of inquiry which enables the answering not only of what questions, but also why and 
how questions in a contextual setting (Creswell, 2007, Yin, 2009). Therefore the method 
enables the study of risks over time and within a bounded system; something that cannot be 
achieved via a survey for example. Third, the case study approach enables the researcher to get 
closer to the phenomenon under investigation through understanding a project’s risks and 
their emergent character, from the point of view of participants and in their words (Yin, 2009). 
Fourth, multiple data sources enable not only the collection of rich data but also triangulation 
of data, which contributes to research validity (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Stake, 1995).  
3.1 Background of the case 
The case study is of a university IS development project. This case was selected because of a 
lack of attention to risks, their inadequate management and escalation; factors which can be 
considered to be one of the major reasons for the project’s eventual failure. The aim of the 
project was to develop and implement a centralized accounting system that would comply with 
new government accounting standards in Thailand. The new system, AccSys, was also expected 
to generate financial reports for university executives that would enable them to make 
informed financial decisions. AccSys consisted of four sub-systems: budgeting, warehousing, 
accounting, and finance, and they were expected to be fully integrated in order to provide high 
quality on and off-campus online access to the system by all staff. According to the initial 
project plan a prototype was to be completed within the first year of the project (2003), with a 
fully functioning system completed by 2006. However in 2006 the project team announced a 
delay in the project and by 2007 only about 50-60% of the system had been implemented. In 
2010, the project manager announced a further delay in the project, promising that the system 
would be fully operational by the end of 2012. The project was initially funded by the Thailand 
Office of Higher Education and then by the university during the extension period of the 
project. 
3.2 Data collection  
The primary data sources for the study were: semi-structured interviews and project 
documentation. The data collected from the semi-structured interviews provided rich 
descriptions of the project. Interviewees consisted of the project team members only since the 
study was interested in the project team’s perceptions of risk, along with the decisions and 
actions taken to prevent and manage these risks. At the commencement of the project, the 
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team consisted of eight staff members. At the time the data for this case study were collected 
all remaining members of this initial project team were invited to participate. Four project 
team members took part: the project manager, the project leader, a systems analyst, and a 
project developer. Table 1 summarizes the role and responsibilities of each interviewee. A 
standardized schedule of questions was devised before the interviews took place, with 
additional questions asked during interviews to respond to interviewees’ answers. The 
interviews lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 hours. 
 
Member of the team Responsibility 
Project manager Monitor overall project development and milestones, formal
communication about project-related matters with users in each 
university unit, including requirements collection and system
testing.  
Project leader Project coordination, make final decisions on behalf of the team, 
resolve technical problems found in the project development,
monitor and control day-to-day progress on the project. 
System analyst(s) Responsibility for system design, database analysis and design,
user interface design, and documentation. Day-to-day contact 
with users to collect and clarify their requirements for project
developers.  
Project developer(s) Each programmer will be assigned the task of building a
particular sub-system of AccSys. Collaboration with system 
analyst in order to develop the project. 
Table 1. Interviewees: project role and responsibilities 
The project documentation collected was used to crosscheck and validate data obtained during 
interviews (Silverman, 2006). Table 2 summarizes the documents collected and used in the 
study.  
 
Document Name Date Produced 
Meeting minutes  December 2004 – May 2008 
Organization structure  December 2005 
Project manuals and details for the four major
sub-systems  
October 2005 – November 2008 
Project progress to OHE  December 2007 
Report of problems and solutions  December 2005 
Risk management report  September 2006 
Table 2.Key project documentation used 
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3.3 Data analysis method 
A thematic analysis of the risks that occurred on the project, how they arose and were 
perceived, and the actions and decisions taken to mitigate these risks was initially conducted 
(Drummond, 1998). While this method of analysis enables the answering of questions around 
what risks arose and why, it is unable explain how actions and decisions relating their 
management in itself was a contributing factor in escalating the risks and in turn the project. 
A subsequent analysis was therefore conducted using Keil’s (1995) model of escalation factors 
as a lens to analyse the observed cycle of risk escalation that unfolded following risk 
management actions taken to address initial risks.  
4 FINDINGS 
This section presents the risks that emerged as the project unfolded; focusing on the three 
major areas of risk, i.e. requirement risks, personnel risks, and resource management risks, 
which are believed to be the consequence of poor project management and which contributed 
to the project failing. The remainder of this section will describe and explain why these risks 
arose; while the next section (Section 5) will present a model of how escalation factors 
contributed to and resulted from inadequate management of these project risks 
4.1 Requirements risks 
Requirements risks were identified as the most significant risk contributing in this case to the 
delay of the project and user dissatisfaction with the system. Three types of requirement risks 
were observed and they were: diversity of requirements, misunderstanding of requirements, 
and instability of requirements. Diversity of requirements refers to the degree to which stake-
holders differ in their views of the system’s requirements and as a result have difficulty 
reaching agreement (Robinson et al., 2003).  
The size and complexity of a project are the main reasons for diversity. In general the more 
user departments involved the greater diversity of user requirements is; and similarly the more 
complex the project is the more likely requirements diversity will occur (Liu et al., 2011). The 
general expectation of the AccSys was that it would be used by at least 80 user departments 
across the university and could accommodate the different workflows that each department 
had. Therefore the project team was struggling to consolidate the diversity of requirements and 
to get user representatives to reach a consensus on their department’s requirements.  
“[...] each user department has its own workflow and practice. A project that tries 
to create a system with a standardized workflow that is agreed and shared by all 
departments would be inevitably challenging and complicated. (Project leader) 
“We had a lot of meetings to try to reach consensus on user requirements” (Project 
manager) 
“The challenge to us was to implement a system that can satisfy all user 
departments’ needs and system preferences.” (Project leader) 
In order to simplify and shorten the time of the requirements collection process the project 
manager took a decision only to collect requirements from those who were perceived to be a 
reliable source of those requirements. This decision created a situation where the project team 
misunderstood the system requirements due to the partial or inaccurate information given. 
This was compounded by the failure, before the system was developed, to verify the 
requirements with the rest of user representatives before the system was developed. The 
system which was subsequently developed was therefore based on the project team’s partial 
understanding of the system requirements and the system was rejected by the user 
departments whose requirements had not been taken into account.  
“The UML design did not contain sufficient details of the user system. […] On 
several occasions, we had to collect more requirements from the users.” (Project 
developer) 
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Requirements instability poses a significant risk to project success because a simple change in 
design in one part of the system can incur substantial changes elsewhere in the system (De-
Marco and Lister, 2003, Liu et al., 2011). Other project and external influences can also 
exacerbate a situation of requirements instability e.g. a change of project champion or a change 
in government policy. In this case study the new Head of Finance Department requested 
additional changes to a set of user requirements that were agreed by the previous head. This 
request, according to the interviewees, was motivated by her wanting to prove knowledge of 
and competence with the finance system to others. Obliged to accept the request the project 
team agreed to modify the system despite the fact that this might mean a further delay in the 
project delivery. Changes in the Thai government’s policy on budget control at the time of the 
project led the university’s Budgeting Department to request modifications in the way AccSys 
generated budget reports. Again the project team accepted requests for changes since they 
believed the request was legitimate and that the situation was a one-off. In reality the change 
meant that about 3000 reports generated from the system were affected. 
“This was not the first case. I told them how dared they let users change these 
requirements. They should have asked me before making any changes. I am 
confident that I would be able to persuade the users to reconsider their requests 
for change so that project could continue without any delay.” (Project leader) 
“What is the point to have a system which ends up unused by users?” From the 
users’ point of view it is their rights to change requirements for the system as the 
perceived that “it would be unfair to ask them to provide all requirements in one 
time as they should be allowed to give the requirements whenever and whatever 
they can come up with.” (System analyst) 
4.2 Personnel risks 
The lack of qualified personnel in the project had a significant impact on the progress of the 
project. Less than 50% of the system was ready by the end of the system development phase 
for system testing, while the rest of the system was either in the process of the development or 
still at the planning stage. The risk occurred mainly because of the recruitment policy which 
prevented the project team from recruiting sufficient number of people to work on the project 
and which subsequently led to staff shortage. 
“I think that the executive probably thought that we didn’t have much to do! I 
heard that there were 33 applicants applying for the available positions in this 
project, but none of them met the executive's criteria. How could that be possible?” 
(System analyst) 
This staff shortage together with the problems associated with the requirement risks 
contributed to a serious delay in the project.  
“If we really wanted to finish the project within the timeframe, we need more staff 
working on the project.” (Project leader) 
The shortage also created a situation where existing members had to take on additional work 
without being given any incentives. Thus, some staff actively sought employment opportunities 
elsewhere. The resignations of project developer and system analyst escalated the situation. 
“One project developer resigned because he found a better paid project developer 
position in other organization.” (System analyst) 
According to the management, they were not aware of the situation otherwise they could have 
resolved the problem earlier. And their solution to the problem was to relax the recruitment 
policy by changing required qualifications. Although this solution helped the project team 
recruit new staff it made the situation somewhat worse because the existing staff not only had 
to continue taking additional work but also had to look after new recruits who did not have the 
necessary skills to carry out the project.  
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4.3 Resource management risks 
Resource management risks refer to poor resource management, e.g. a lack of effective 
resource planning and control (Schmidt et al., 2001). In the case of AccSys the resource 
management risk was due to the lack of appropriate project management experience especially 
in the area of project planning, project management of large project, and implementation 
mismanagement. The emergence of this risk can be traced back to the beginning of the project 
when the decision was made to develop the system in-house. According to the project manager, 
the decision was inevitable as the grant given by the Office of Higher Education Commission 
was not enough for the university to outsource the project to an experienced software house.  
“Honestly, the reasonable funding for a user organization to outsource this 
project would be around 200 million bahts. The outsourcing company might 
implement SAP or Oracle in the university and ask everyone to just follow the 
standard and procedures embedded in the system. The outsourcing strategy has 
been proven successful elsewhere for example in Petroleum Thai group. But, we 
did not have that much money. The maximum amount of funding that we could 
get was only 3-4 million bahts.” (Project manager) 
None of the people in the team including the project manager himself had sufficient knowledge 
and experience of managing a complex and large-scale project. This lack of experience was 
reflected for example in the lack of a contingency plan for some common and anticipatable risk 
factors, e.g. changing user requirements and departure of staff members, so that when those 
risks emerged the team was unable to deal with them effectively (Project Management 
Institute, 2013, Pender, 2001). Another example of lack of experience was that the project team 
underestimated the complexity of the system’s development and did not allocate enough time 
to each task (Peterson et al., 2002, Vener et al, 2005). The unrealistic scheduling had knock on 
effect on the subsequent tasks and their schedules. 
“To be frank, at the beginning I thought that what we needed to do was only to 
convert users’ existing fill-in-form documents into electronic applications and 
that’s it!” (Project leader)  
In addition to unrealistic scheduling the progress of system development was not made 
transparent to the management. The project leader pointed out that he was not aware of any 
problems or being updated with the state of play in project progress. In this sense the 
management was unable to revise the project schedule to reflect the actual situation and the 
gap between the real schedule and the schedule on the paper continued widen. 
“The system analyst did not respect my authority. I kept asking for a progress 
report and its details so many times, but she intended to forget.” (Project leader) 
5 TOWARDS A MODEL OF RISK ESCALATION 
This section develops an explanation of how the risks identified and managed contributed not 
to their alleviation but their escalation. This explanation is organized around the positing of 
escalation factors intervening between the identification and the management of risk factors, 
and emerging as a result of that management.  
We have observed in the case study that the decisions taken by the project manager and leader 
tended to be pragmatic decisions designed to fix problems that were perceived to be temporary 
setbacks and which could be easily resolved for example by their decision to reduce the number 
of participants during user requirements collection in order to reduce diverse requirements; 
and by lowering recruitment standards in order to recruit personnel for the project. Pragmatic 
decision-making is a behaviour that usually leads to a quick, obvious, or easy solution while 
the problem indeed needs more considered thought (Drummond and Hodgson, 1996, Talukder 
and Quazi, 2010). 
The consequences of such decisions often lead to further problems because decision makers 
fail to appreciate the situation in its broader context (i.e. outside its immediate context), along 
Australasian Journal of Information Systems  Lin & Parinyavuttichai 
2015, vol. 19, pp. 1-22  Project Risks as Emergent Phenomena 
  11 
with the impact of the decisions on the project as a whole (Keil, 1995; Keil et al, 2000; 
Drummond, 1998). By allocating resources to manage the consequences of these ‘quick and 
dirty’ decisions means that resources can be withdrawn from the pool and diverted to fix the 
unexpected problems (Pan et al., 2009). Needless to say, project escalation can quickly be 
triggered. 
Pragmatic decision-making can be both an effect of and cause of information framing and 
processing bias. It can be an effect because information framing and processing bias can 
influence decisions about resource allocation by ‘perceiving problems as temporary’ or 
‘believing that the project will be finished soon’(Rutledge, 1994). It can be a cause of 
information processing bias because the decision is likely to ‘direct’ people to think in a 
particular way or to ‘encourage’ people to ignore certain information and signs. For example, 
the project manager’s decision about collecting user requirements from a few randomly 
selected user representatives had encouraged the team to consider certain aspects of the 
systems and process only the selective information. The decision subsequently led to 
requirement risks including partial understanding of the system requirements and 
requirements instability. 
Pragmatic decision-making can also be interpreted as self-interest. It is widely agreed in the IS 
literature that while involving users in project development can be time consuming, costly, and 
difficult to manage nevertheless not involving users can risk project success (Cresswell et al., 
2013, Markus and Mo, 2004, McLeod et al., 2007). In this study we observed that the decision 
not to involve all user representatives was mainly down to saving costs (time and resources) 
and trouble (collecting and managing diverse requirements) and to shorten the time for 
gathering user requirements 
“We had a lot of meetings with users and I was bored with trying to get all users 
to agree on the requirements.” (Project manager) 
The literature also suggests that when an IS project is perceived to have large potential payoff 
for the organisation in the long run the level of commitment tends to be high and the resources 
allocated are perceived as long-term investments rather as ‘costs’ (Alvarez, 2011, Drummond, 
2005, Guah, 2008,Keil, 1995,Northcraftand Wolf, 1984,Staw and Ross, 1987). With such 
perception decision makers tend to continue to commit resources to the project. The 
management of the university and project team continued to pursue the project at any cost was 
partly because they collectively believed that the system could benefit the university in the long 
run in different aspects. Socially speaking, the university could earn respect among other 
universities for completing the project; politically, the university could show the funding 
bodies their system development credentials and increase their chances of being awarded with 
other grants in the future; and organizationally the system could improve the efficiency in the 
university. Perceiving the project as a long term investment, the university management 
continued funding the project because collectively they also believe that the project would be 
completed as soon as the problems are resolved. The beliefs highlight that with the shared 
interests different groups of stakeholders can collectively commit to a failing projects and this 
finding is unlike what has been shown in many studies that only individual decision makers 
are trapped in such situation (Drummond, 1998, Keil, 1995, Newman and Sabherwal, 1996, 
Snow and Keil, 2002). 
Collective commitment can be interpreted as a result of self-justification behaviour where both 
individuals and organization as a whole try to avoid embarrassment because of mistakes made. 
Garland (1990) argues that people are likely to continue to authorize additional resources as a 
way of justifying the initial investment especially when the size of the initial investment is large 
(Garland, 1990). The university's decision to continue funding the project can hence be 
interpreted as an attempt to avoid the realization of sunk costs and loss (Keil, 1995). While not 
wanting to admit the failure and avoid embarrassment may be the causes of collective 
commitment they are also the results of face saving. For example the project team had to save 
their face within the university at the same time the management of university wanted to save 
the face among other universities, therefore they were both in the situation that they could not 
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withdraw from the project but continue with it. This can explain why the projects that have a 
lot of publicity are more prone to project escalation e.g. Mandata project (Sauer, 2003),Taurus 
project at London Stock Exchange (Drummond 1996, Goulielmos, 2003, Smith and Keil, 
2003), Computer Aided Dispatch system at London Ambulance Service (Finkelstein, 1993, 
Goulielmos, 2003), and US Census Bureau Information System (Krigsman, 2008).  
The two risks, lack of project experience and recruitment problems escalated because of 
learned helplessness, mum effect, and deaf effect. Learned helplessness refers to a situation 
where an individual neglects to respond logically to the current project situation because of 
his/her previous attempts to resolve the problem continue to fail or are refused by others 
(Seligman, 1975, Beck et al., 2010). It is noteworthy that the members of the team were 
reluctant to report problems but solving the problems themselves because their previous 
attempts to offering solutions to the management were often rejected. Not reporting or 
communicating vital information can also be what is termed as ‘mum effect’ where individuals 
are reluctant to report negative information and ‘blow the whistle’ (Robey and Keil, 2001, 
Smith and Keil, 2003). The mum effect is normally associated with individuals’ concern not to 
be punished and as such as risk their careers. Robey and Keil (2001) report that those who 
have little job security or mobility have most to lose and little to gain. They are therefore the 
least likely to act as a whistle blower. The mum effect can explain why members did not report 
the problems but tried to solve problems themselves because except for the senior system 
analyst the rest of the team held only temporary position for the duration of the project and 
they were worried about losing their job if they reported any problems or were perceived to 
make any troubles.  
Not only were the project team members reluctant to report problems (e.g. learned 
helplessness and mum effect) but the management was also reluctant to digest bad news. ‘Deaf 
effect’ occurs when decision makers downplay or otherwise not take vital information on board 
(Cuellar et al., 2006). The case study shows that deaf effect can be intentional and 
psychologically, politically, and organizationally motivated (Robey and Keil, 2001). 
Psychologically for example the systems analyst’s attachment to a particular system 
development method and her own way of doing things resulted in her turning a deaf ear to the 
expert opinions of others. Politically the project leader turned a deaf ear to the complaints 
about the system analyst; and organizationally the decision makers did not respond in any 
meaningful way to the problems reported.  
Self-interest is a striking feature of the project. Self-interest was observed when the project 
leader was reluctant to ask progress reports from the system analyst because he did not want 
to harm his relationship with the colleague; the project manager did not put much effort into 
the project monitoring because he valued his other roles in the university which were more 
career significant; the system analyst had her personal agenda and only interested in 
developing the system using her own methodology; and the new Head of Finance Department, 
who appeared later on the scene, wanted to demonstrate her competence in the area and 
requested changes in the previously agreed requirements. 
“There were arguments over the database design between the members of the 
advisory group and our system analyst. ...the system analyst was over confident 
in her knowledge. She never listened to any suggestions about the database 
design made by the lecturers.” (Project leader) 
Drummond and Hodgson (1996) assert that deviousness and self-interest usually associate 
with individuals’ political motivations and behaviours and influence the decision process. The 
presence of management supports and commitment to a project has been argued as a critical 
success factor (Wallace et al., 2004).The standard IS literature argues that the management 
support and commitment publicly display the importance of an information system to the 
users and therefore encourage user collaboration and reduce user resistance to the project and 
system (Elbanna, 2013; Petter et al, 2014; Sharma and Yetton, 2011). From the escalation of 
commitment perspective, the management support and commitment means the management 
will be more vigilant and monitor the project progress closely (Newman and Sabherwal, 1996). 
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For ‘self-interest’ reasons both project manager and project leader failed to monitor and take 
control of the project progress therefore they failed to manage the risks in time and as such 
those risks became instrumental in the creation of other kinds of risks.  
“I should blame myself for the inappropriate design. I should have paid more 
attention to this process. I would not find any problems if I constantly monitored 
the project. [...] Especially for the database design issues, I think I would be able 
to give suggestions on how to prevent the design problems.” (Project leader) 
The other side of the same coin, senior management support and commitment can also be a 
key to continue investing in a failing course of action. Senior managers may commit to a project 
for political reasons even though warning signs exist (Staw and Ross, 1987, Keil, 1995). The 
AccSys project continued to receive funding from the university after the funding from the Thai 
Higher Education Commission ceased because it was important politically for the university to 
complete the project. Project completion would demonstrate to other universities and 
government funding agencies the university’s competence in carrying out a multimillion baht 
project.  
Structural changes are normally less predictable and their occurrence either within a project 
or in its environment cannot be so easily controlled. The confusion and uncertainty created as 
a result of these structural changes can be observed in IT projects where regulations and 
institutional logics in an organization change because of changes in the organization’s own 
environment e.g. a change in government policy (Guah, 2008). The changes in government 
policy and the change in project champion in the Finance Department both have impacts on 




antecedent (A) to and 





Resource management risks  Collective commitment （A or 
C） 
Continue funding the 
project  
Resource management risks  Perceived the problems as 
temporary setback (A) 
Allocating additional 
resources 
Resource management risks  Long-term-investment (A) Continue funding the 
project because the system 
will benefit the university 
in the long term 
Psychological factors 
Resource management risks  Self-justification (C) Continue funding the 
project to avoid 
embarrassment and 
realizing sunk costs.   
Personnel (staff shortage) 
and resource management 
risks (unrealistic schedule) 
Learned helplessness/Mum 
effect (C) 
Not reporting problems to 
the management and 
trying to solve problems 
themselves 
Resource management risks 
(resources were allocated to 
fixed the problems arising 
from the wrong design) 
Deaf effect (C) The analyst designed the 




responding to the 
complaints about the 
analyst’s behaviours 
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risks (unqualified personnel) 
Information framing and 
processing bias (A or C) 
Quick and dirty decisions 
(pragmatic behavior) 
including reducing 
number of user 
representatives to 
participate in requirement 
collection, change 
recruitment policy in order 
recruit new staff.   
Resource risks (unrealistic 
scheduling, allocating 
additional resources which 
were not planned to fix the 
mistakes), Requirement 
risks  
Self-interest (C) The project leader failed to 
pressurize the analyst to 
submit the progress 
report; the project team 
decided to simplify their 
tasks by not involving all 
user representatives 
Social factors 
Resource management risks  Face saving (A or C) Collective commitment to 
the project; long term 
investment 
Structural factors 
Resources management risk  Lack of managerial support (A) Lack of commitment to 
project monitoring and 
control 
Requirement risks (changing 
requirements), resource 
management risks 
(allocating more resources) 
Changing project champion 
(C) 
New Head of Finance 
asked for changes  
Requirement risks, resource 
management risks  
Changing environment (C) Changing functionality to 
meet changing 
government policy  
Table 3.Risks, Escalation Factors, Risk Management Decisions/Actions: Summary 
Based on the above discussions, Table 3 summarises the relationships between risks, 
decision/action, and escalation factors. We have categorised our findings: collective 
commitment under the category of project factor and learned helplessness/mum effect, deaf 
effect, and self-interest under the category of psychological factor. These factors were not 
identified in Keil’s initial work in 1995 (Figure 1) but they have been found playing a part in 
escalation in this and other studies. For example, Keil and his colleagues in their late work have 
argued that learned helplessness/mum effect and deaf effect can cause project escalation 
(Cullar et al, 2006, Keil et al., 2001, Lee et al, 2014, Robey, and Keil, 2001, Smith et al, 2001, 
Smith and Keil, 2003). Self-interest and collective commitment are least discussed in the 
escalation literature nevertheless their importance in decision making have been discussed 
elsewhere especially in group decision making literature, for example the former can lead to 
less than optimal collective outcome (Caporael et al., 1989, Meglino and Korsgaard, 2004) 
while the latter can lead to escalation (Chapman 2006, Kroon et al., 1991).  
Based on the finding and escalation theory, we argue that the sub-optimal decisions are subject 
to the influences of combinations of different project, psychological, social, and structural 
factors (e.g. learned helpless and mum effect; deaf effect and self-interest; perceived as 
temporary setback and information processing bias) at both individual and group level. For 
example, face saving (social factor) and self-interest (psychological factor) can lead to collective 
commitment to allocate more resources to a failing project as no one is willing to withdraw 
from the project and face with social and political consequences. Similarly, the belief in long-
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term investment (project factor) can be used as an excuse for self-justification (psychological 
factor) and face saving (social factor).  
 
Figure 2. Towards a Model of Risk Escalation 
Figure 2 highlights that the decisions or actions taken to solve problems can lead to unintended 
risks. As Drummond (1998) describes “’solutions’ intended to eliminate ‘problems’ actually 
compound them. Unintended negative consequences arise from pursuing economically 
rational objectives” (Drummond, 1998, p923). The unintended risks can reinforce particular 
factors and force more suboptimal decisions, and so on.  
6 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study has investigated the IS project risks from the perspective of their escalation. The 
case study has shed light not only on their identification and management, but also how the 
presence of escalating factors contributed to the project manager’s and leader’s escalation of 
these risks rather than their mitigation (Drummond, 1998). The knock-on effects of these 
decision give rise to further project escalation and in turn risk escalation (see Figure 2).The 
study has identified and demonstrated that rather than being anticipatable, and hence 
predictable and controllable, risks can also emerge during a project due to escalating socio-
psychological factors (e.g. self-interest, learn helpless, mum and deaf effects, collective 
commitment) over-riding technical and economic rationalities (Drummond, 1994, 1998; Ross 
and Staw, 1993). The study also highlights the relationship between risk cause and risk effect 
is not always straightforward due to the presence of intervening factors and that decisions or 
actions taken to counteract risks can also have unintended consequences which generate more 
risks.  
This study has a number of implications for the literature. First, the study has demonstrated 
how an escalation model can be adapted as a useful analytical tool to study risk and its 
emergence. Figure 2 combines escalation factors and IS project risks into a conceptual 
framework that can be used and extended to study the IS project risks from an emergent 
perspective that overcomes the limitations of linear thinking (i.e. simple cause and effect 
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relationships). When studying risk, attention should be given not only to risk, the reasons for 
its occurrence (activating mechanism), and its management; but also to factors that mediate 
between the risks that occur and their effects. Second, the study shows how the presence of 
socio-psychological factors in a project are more critical to the emergence of risks and their 
escalation than has hitherto been given credit for in the literature. The impact of these factors 
in the context of IS and IS project risk management is an area for subsequent research. Third, 
the study has shown how risks, and their escalation can emerge as the unintended negative 
consequences of positive interventions. Thus, in order to better understand how risks occur 
one should trace the sequence of events and illuminate the underlying logics of decisions 
(Drummond, 1998). Fourth, this study demonstrates how the impact of these escalating factors 
is mediated through decisions or actions taken to solve risk problems. Therefore in order to 
understand how risks emerge and escalate it is important to identify the relevant decisions and 
actions first and then proceed to trace back how the decisions were arrived at in the given 
context. Finally, this study has identified further escalation factors (Table 3) to supplement 
Keil’s 1995 work (Figure 1) and suggests that to advance the understanding of risk escalation 
these factors: collective commitment, learned helplessness/mum effect, deaf effect, self-
interest and their effect on project need to be further researched individually. 
The practical implications of the dynamic relationship between risk management and 
escalation is that it demonstrates how the mismanagement of risks can become a vicious circle 
and that can eventually lead to project escalation. Recognizing early warning signs and 
managing risks carefully can avoid project escalation (Pan et al., 2009). Nevertheless it is worth 
noting that being able to recognize the warning signs and escalation patterns and act upon the 
signs and make appropriate decisions require sufficient project management experience. In 
this sense, appointing experienced project managers for large scale and mission critical 
projects should be the first step of risk management (Bloch et al., 2012, Fortune and White, 
2006, Hougham, 1996). Second, the findings of the study and the literature have shown that 
project risks is not just about managing ‘risks’ but dealing with people and social dynamics 
(Wrights and Capps, 2010). Practitioners hence should view and manage risks as people and 
social problems rather than as system and technical problems. Finally practitioners must avoid 
making pragmatic decisions or taking shortcuts when problems arise because those decisions 
or shortcuts are often made without considering the project as whole and the long term effects 
of its consequences on the project and they are likely to backfire. In sum, the case presented 
and the model developed can be used in the future both to aid further research into IS project 
risk as an emergent phenomenon, plus act as a tool for practitioners to begin to manage risk 
not only from a perspective of their anticipation but also from the perspective of observing and 
managing their emergent, situational and interdependent character. 
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